

Secure Provisioning of IoT Devices

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Abstract

With the role of IoT devices being more important than ever before, many large-scale applications of IoT devices are emerging. However, setting up a large number of IoT devices is time-consuming, as in most cases, it involves taking each IoT device individually, reflashing its firmware based on the device's use-case, and reconfiguring the device's settings to include the correct Wi-Fi credentials as well as other device-specific settings based on the use-case application. The aim of this paper is to create a zero-touch provisioning protocol that will configure the IoT device on its first boot automatically in a secure manner. At this stage of development, the work focuses on secure provisioning of Wi-Fi credentials, as the credentials cannot be shared with the device manufacturer for security reasons, and they cannot be obtained by the application code as the device has no internet connectivity. The protocol uses a dedicated configurator device to obtain the credentials, with a challenge-response authentication in place to verify the new device is authorized to obtain these credentials.

Keywords: IoT — Secure provisioning — IoT device provisioning

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1. Introduction

Over the past two years, the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices sold annually has increased from 3.9 million in 2018 to 4.8 million in 2019 and is expected to reach 5.8 million in 2020 [1]. IoT devices are now not used by enthusiasts and home users only but they also play a vital role in many large-scale business applications. However, utilizing IoT devices in large-scale environments brings new challenges when deploying hundreds or thousands of new devices to an IoT network.

New devices must be provided with network credentials so they can connect to the target network, and their application software often needs to be configured based on the use-case of each device. In home environments, this usually means flashing each device with application-specific firmware and configuring it manually. This approach deems unacceptable for large-scale applications because a considerable amount of time would have to be spent by configuring each individual device.

The aim of this paper is to create a protocol that

will reduce the amount of user interaction needed to onboard a new device as much as possible, ideally to an extent no configuration on the IoT device is necessary at all while keeping the provisioning process secure. In particular, an unauthorized IoT device must not be able to connect to the target network, even if an attacker is able to sniff the communication of a legitimate device that is joining the network.

As will be shown in section 2, there already exist some approaches that simplify this provisioning process. These approaches can not only be found in the field of IoT devices, but also in other areas. For example, when connecting a new printer to a network, the Bonjour protocol ensures the printer is automatically available for all computers within the network. The protocol also supports limited remote management of the target device, such as finding the ink level status. However, this protocol is not able to set the Wi-Fi credentials for the printer.

In the field of IoT devices, it is common that an unconfigured IoT device creates a Wi-Fi access point. Another Wi-Fi device (e.g. a smartphone) is used to

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45 connect to this network. Upon connecting, the user
46 is redirected to a landing page with a form asking the
47 user to provide necessary configuration details. While
48 this process is easy to use, it does not scale well when
49 configuring multiple IoT devices.

50 Our protocol focuses on the process of provision-
51 ing network details to a new IoT device. To achieve
52 this, each IoT device is provided with a pair of keys
53 that can be used for asymmetric cryptography, and a
54 dedicated *Configurator* device is used to provide the
55 connection details to the IoT device during its first boot
56 automatically. To prevent unauthorized devices from
57 receiving the connection details from the Configurator,
58 the Configurator device needs to be configured with
59 a whitelist of devices that are allowed to access the
60 target network beforehand (each device is identified
61 by a hash of its public key). The Configurator uses
62 a challenge-response algorithm to verify the enrollee
63 device possesses the private key.

64 The proposed algorithm simplifies the process of
65 mass-provisioning of multiple IoT devices with net-
66 work credentials because the need to hand-configure
67 each device is eliminated in favor of providing a list
68 of unique identifiers of permitted devices to a single
69 Configurator device. In the future, the work can be
70 further expanded to support making modifications to
71 the firmware of each device based on its application
72 needs.

73 2. Previous works

74 This section reviews notable existing approaches to
75 IoT provisioning. The section uses peer-reviewed aca-
76 demic sources to gather theoretical background, and
77 web resources to overview implementations in com-
78 mercial solutions.

79 One of the earliest approaches to device provision-
80 ing was suggested by Patrick et al. [2] in 2010 when
81 IoT devices were merely emerging. The approach was
82 designed for connecting devices such as printers to
83 a new network. These devices – just like current IoT
84 devices – offered little or no user interface to receive
85 network configuration details. The approach uses ex-
86 isting *network discovery protocols* (such as Bonjour,
87 WS-Discovery, and UPnP) to obtain network connec-
88 tion details. The protocols allow automatic addressing
89 and naming of devices and service discovery. How-
90 ever, the addressing feature relies on using DHCP or
91 link-local addressing in wired networks and does not
92 support dynamic provisioning of credentials for wire-
93 less networks [3, 4]. Nevertheless, the protocols can
94 be used to discover already connected IoT devices and
95 enable further configuration.

A different approach uses a *gateway device* that
is responsible for aggregating multiple IoT devices in
a single LAN segment by periodically reading data
from all IoT devices in its segment, post-processing
them, and sending the summarized data to a cloud
computer. Unlike the aforementioned design, this ap-
proach does not require any specific support from the
IoT device, but the gateway device implements all
APIs provided by the IoT devices and provides a sin-
gle API that can be used as a relay to individual IoT
devices. Thus, this approach may be used to manage
multiple devices from different vendors in a unified
manner (as long as the gateway device supports the
specific IoT device). Some gateways also provide an
interface for provisioning new devices, but this often
consists of a different user interface for entering net-
work credentials and does not help the automatization
of a large-scale onboarding process too much. [5, 6]

The gateway device approach is further improved
by a *Device Cloud Middleware* approach. Instead of
relying on one gateway device, this approach presents
a three-layer architecture that consists of the *Physical*
Space, the *Runtime Space* and the *Social Space* lay-
ers. All physical devices (both end-node IoT devices
and gateways) are present in the Physical Space layer,
while the Runtime Space layer is responsible for trans-
lating messages between Physical Space devices. The
Runtime Space achieves this either by simply resend-
ing the message if both communication devices share
the same API or by routing the message through sev-
eral Physical Space devices in a chain of compatible
devices. Finally, the Social Space layer is responsible
for providing a user interface. [7]

The issue of provisioning of new devices is also
solved when creating new virtual devices in the cloud,
regardless of whether a virtual IoT device is created,
or a full-stack machine is installed. One of the major
Linux distributions – Ubuntu – offers a *cloud-init*
package that is pre-installed on live servers images.
A cloud provider is able to send arbitrary user data to
the operating system during machine startup, which is
collected by the *cloud-init* package and the oper-
ating system’s configuration is adjusted based on this
data (the configuration string may include a post-install
bash script, which allows for arbitrary configuration
changes in the system) [8].

A cloud provider *Amazon Web Services (AWS)* of-
fers the Amazon Certificate Manager service that can
be used to provision a new IoT device. To provision
a new device, the device must first generate an asym-
metric public and private key pair. Then, the device
will generate a certificate signing request (CSR), that

148 consists of non-sensitive data only, such as device and
149 organization name, its location, and the signature of
150 this CSR. This CSR is sent to Amazon Certificate
151 Manager, which must decide its eligibility using an
152 out-of-band channel, for example by comparing the
153 device's unique identifier (UUID) with a whitelist. If
154 allowed, the Manager will sign the certificate and send
155 it to the device. The device will then be able to use
156 this certificate to connect to the network. [9]

157 Finally, most IoT devices currently offer limited
158 tools to provision a new device compared to previous
159 approaches. The *ESP32-S2* microchip used in this
160 paper supports two provisioning protocols, Protocol
161 Communication (Protocomm) and SmartConfig. The
162 *Protocomm* protocol provides an extensible API with
163 a pre-made open-source implementation. The imple-
164 mentation can be used as-is, or a developer can extend
165 it based on a specific use-case scenario. The protocol
166 consists of an IoT-device-side code and a smartphone
167 application. By default, the IoT device creates a tem-
168 porary Wi-Fi Access Point (AP) that the smartphone
169 can connect to. This establishes a secure session be-
170 tween the IoT device and the smartphone. Then, the
171 smartphone app is used to provide the device with
172 network connection details, such as SSID, username,
173 and password. These details are transmitted using the
174 protocomm protocol and saved into the device. [10]

175 The *SmartConfig* protocol is a provisioning proto-
176 col developed by Texas Instruments. Just like proto-
177 comm, the protocol uses a smartphone app to config-
178 ure the device. Instead of establishing a connection
179 between the smartphone and the IoT device, the smart-
180 phone app broadcasts the network connection details.
181 The IoT device is able to receive these details and use
182 them to configure itself. Thus, this approach is easier
183 to use because it is not necessary to connect to the
184 IoT device manually, but it might be less secure if the
185 communication is sniffed by an attacker. [11]

186 3. Terminology

187 This section explains some fundamental concepts us-
188 ing in the implementation. First, some notes on the
189 capabilities of the chosen IoT device will be given. Af-
190 terwards, the ESP-NOW communication protocol and
191 the Wi-Fi Easy Connect standard will be introduced.

192 3.1 Device of choice

193 The device of choice is *ESP32-S2-Saola-1* developed
194 by Espressif Systems. ESP32 is a low-power Systems-
195 On-Chip (SoC) microchip that features a single-core
196 32-bit microprocessor that can run at frequencies up
197 to 240 MHz. The chip can store data in 128 kB ROM,

320 MB RAM, and variable-sized flash memory (up 198
to 4 MB). The chip provides similar interfaces as any 199
common microchip device, including Wi-Fi, GPIO, 200
and UART, and a security module to facilitate common 201
cryptographic tasks. [12] 202

3.2 ESP-NOW 203

ESP-NOW [13] is a proprietary protocol that allows 204
connectionless communication between ESP devices. 205
ESP-NOW leverages Wi-Fi communication protocol, 206
where application data are encapsulated in a vendor- 207
specific action frame, thus eliminating the need to 208
form a connection between devices prior to sending 209
messages. 210

The protocol can transmit any binary data, and 211
the communication can be either unicast or broadcast, 212
depending on the developer's choice. The protocol 213
uses MAC addresses of the Wi-Fi interface to identify 214
the devices. 215

The protocol uses symmetric-key cryptography to 216
encrypt messages, but this feature is not used in this 217
paper. Instead, ESP-NOW will be used as a transpar- 218
ent out-of-band protocol and all encryption will be 219
applied in the application layer when needed. This is 220
because some messages such as presence announce- 221
ments are meant to be unencrypted and some messages 222
need to use asymmetric-key cryptography rather than 223
symmetric-key cryptography. 224

3.3 Wi-Fi Easy Connect 225

Currently, there is a new *Wi-Fi Easy Connect* [14] stan- 226
dard in development. The standard aims to make it 227
easier to connect new devices to a Wi-Fi network. As 228
of now, the standard is in a draft stage and subject to 229
change, thus no commercially available solutions are 230
implemented so far. However, many concepts intro- 231
duced by this standard can be used when designing a 232
new provisioning protocol, and thus this standard is 233
relevant for this paper. 234

As shown in Figure 1, the standard defines two 235
roles of devices: Enrollee and Configurator. 236




Figure 1. Device roles in Wi-Fi Easy Connect architecture

4. Proposed design

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As the Wi-Fi Easy Connect standard is not final and is not yet implemented, the purpose of this paper is to develop a similar protocol that will demonstrate and validate the feasibility of using this approach for provisioning of IoT devices.

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The proposed design is influenced by the upcoming Wi-Fi Easy Connect standard, but there were some changes made during the implementation, typically to omit features that are not relevant for IoT device provisioning, and to leverage the ESP-NOW protocol available in ESP devices to simplify the implementation.

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First of all, the devices' roles were changed so only the endpoint device may play the role of Enrollee, and the Access Point is not configured using this protocol as shown in Figure 2. This way, the protocol can be used with any AP regardless of whether the AP supports the new Wi-Fi Easy Connect standard.

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


Figure 2. Device roles in the proposed architecture

In our design, the Configurator device always plays the role of initiator to eliminate the need for user action on the Enrollee (IoT) device which has limited user interface.

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To simplify the implementation of the Configurator, a dedicated ESP32 device is used as a configurator. This way, the enrollee and configurator can use the ESP-NOW protocol to communicate with each other even though the Enrollee has no Wi-Fi connection established yet.

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The sequence of messages sent during a successful provisioning process is shown in Figure 3. Before the provisioning process is started, each Enrollee device must have generated a pair of private and public keys, and a list of hashes of public keys of eligible enrollees must be stored in the Configurator device using an out-of-band channel.

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During the provisioning process, the following sequence of events occurs:

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- First, the Enrollee periodically broadcasts a presence announcement message. This message includes the Enrollee's public key

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237 **Configurator** devices are responsible for the registration of new devices into the network. A network compatible with the standard needs to have at least one configurator device. It is advised that the Configurator is a device with a graphical interface, such as a smartphone.

243 **Enrollee**, on the other hand, is a device that takes a part in the network. It can either be an endpoint device such as a computer or an IoT device, or a network device such as an access point. The provisioning protocol is not designed to connect endpoint devices only, but it can be used to install new access points in the network as well. The protocol does not differentiate between endpoint devices and access points for the most part, as they are both considered Enrollees.

252 Apart from Configurator and Enrollee, the protocol also defines the roles of *Initiator* and *Responder*. During the provisioning process, one of the communicating devices plays the role of *Initiator* and the other one plays the role *Responder*. The roles are determined by the device that starts the Authentication phase¹ of the provisioning protocol, as this device always becomes the Initiator.

260 The provisioning protocol consist of 4 phases explained below. Before the protocol is started, each device must generate a pair of private and public keys as a prerequisite. In certain scenarios, public keys must be exchanged between specific devices beforehand but this is optional and out of the scope of this paper.

1. During the *bootstrapping phase*, the Responder may periodically broadcast presence announcement messages to inform the Initiator that it is ready to engage in the provisioning process.
2. In the *authentication phase*, the Initiator's identity is verified using public-key cryptography. If mutual authentication is required, this step will be repeated with the roles of the devices swapped.
3. In the *configuration phase*, the connection details are generated by Configurator and provided to the Enrollee. The structure of configuration details varies based on whether the Enrollee is a station or an access point. For example, the transmitted frequency is only sent if the Enrollee is AP.
4. The *access phase* is not part of the provisioning process but is executed every time the device connects to a Wi-Fi network. This phase uses the Connector objects received in the configuration phase to verify the devices' access rights.

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¹This is the second phase of the provisioning protocol.




Figure 3. Communication of devices in the provisioning protocol

- If the Configurator recognizes the Enrollee’s public key, it will generate a nonce and sends an authentication request to the Enrollee. If the Configurator does not recognize the public key, it will ignore the message, as it may be handled by a different Configurator.
- Enrollee encrypts the nonce and sends the result as an authentication reply.
- Configurator verifies the reply using Enrollee’s public key. If successful, a message with configuration details will be sent to the Enrollee. At this stage of development, the message contains the SSID of the Wi-Fi network to connect to and the Pre Shared Key.
- Enrollee stores the received details and uses them to connect to the Access Point.

of private keys.

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6. Evaluation

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The project was evaluated using several test-case scenarios matching the expected use-case. First, the Enrollee device had generated a pair of public and private keys, and the value of the Enrollee’s public key was stored in the Configurator as allowed host. Then, both Enrollee and Configurator devices were powered up. As expected, the Enrollee was able to obtain the Wi-Fi credentials preset on Configurator.

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Other test-cases focused on invalid states, such as an unauthorized Enrollee’s attempt to obtain credential details from Configurator, and simulated message loss.

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5. Implementation

Our implementation is developed using bare-metal code written in C. The device’s manufacturer provides a library with functions providing access to the chip’s hardware modules, such as the Wi-Fi module.

Our implementation first initializes the cryptography, Wi-Fi, and ESP-NOW modules. Then, the application code executes a series of actions as listed at the end of the previous section and shown in Figure 3. All messages need to be serialized into (and deserialized from) byte-arrays manually, while the transmission of byte-arrays is carried on by a manufacturer-implemented function. When handling cryptography, it is the application code’s responsibility to generate the appropriate keys and prepare data to be signed or verified, while the cryptographic module executes the cryptographic operations and provides secure storage

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7. Conclusions

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The provisioning protocol presented in this paper simplifies the process of onboarding a new IoT device to an extent no user configuration needs to be done on the IoT device except for connecting it to a power supply. The necessary network credentials are stored in a single configurator device that will provide these details to all IoT devices during their first boot. To prevent a leak of the network credentials from the configurator, the configurator uses the challenge-response algorithm to authenticate the IoT device. The configurator needs to be configured with a whitelist of accepted public keys beforehand.

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During the implementation of this protocol, several bugs were discovered in the sample code presented in the official documentation of ESP-NOW. These bugs were reported to the company.

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391 With the basic implementation of the protocol pro-
392 viding pre-shared Wi-Fi credentials to Enrollees fin-
393 ished, the protocol can be further expanded in many
394 ways. The implementation can, for example, change
395 the runtime application’s settings based on the specific
396 use-case of each device. Or, the implementation could
397 completely overwrite the IoT device’s application code
398 based on each device’s use-case in form of an over-
399 the-air update – this way, the IoT device might not
400 need to have the application code pre-installed from
401 the manufacturer. The configurator might, of course,
402 generate a different set of Wi-Fi credentials for each
403 IoT device. And finally, the user-interface to set up the
404 whitelist of devices accepted by the configurator could
405 be simplified.

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