

# Fee-Redistribution Contracts

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## Problem Definition

- **Mining gap problem** - miners not mining after new block was found until they have collected enough transactions to cover their expenses
- **Undercutting attack** - malicious miner mines top block to claim some fees from such block. Leaving fees to incentivize mining on his block. Please refer to Figure 3.
- **Fluctuation in revenue** - collected fees are created from dynamic market resulting in fluctuations.

2a

## Proposed Solution

Contract defined as tuple  $FRC(v, \lambda, \rho)$ ,

- $v$  - total value in collected coins in contract FRC
- $\lambda$  - target length, at which we target to redistribute collected fees
- $\rho$  - percentage of collected fees sent to this contract FRC,

where the miner receives reward  $nextClaim$ . This reward is calculated as sliding window average of total value in all contracts.

2b

$$nextClaim_{[H+1]} = \sum_{FRC_{[H]} \in FRCs_{[H]}} \frac{FRC_{[H]} \cdot v}{FRC_{[H]} \cdot \lambda}$$

2c

## Single Contract




Figure 1.

## Miner's reward fluctuation




Figure 2.

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## Undercutting attack




Figure 3.

## Mitigation of undercutting attack




Figure 4.

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## Features & Benefits

- Multiple contract setup allows for better redistribution targeting different lengths
- Sliding window averaging of fees
- Mitigating Miner gap problem
- Delivers more stable rewards
- Fee-Redistribution Contracts significantly reduced Under Cutting Attack.
- Protocol is resilient against ~70% of adverseries compared to previous ~33%.

## Real world applications

- Improvement proposal is being discussed on first blockchain.
- Implemented utilizing single Smart Contract

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